

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

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Control: 3604

Rec'd: November 10, 1962

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SS

Info

FROM: La Paz

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/GDC/MB

SR

TO: Secretary of State

REVIEWED by RK/Deun/Th DATE 3/4/82

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SP

NO: 513, November 9, 6 p.m.

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TS authority to: () CLASSIFY as OADRDepartment Circular telegram 81d. () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

Local opinion re U.S. firm position Cuban crisis at outset assumed U.S. would invade Cuba and put end Castro menace to them domestically. Fact that Khrushchev backed off regarding missile bases was not on reflection hailed as great triumph in Bolivia. Initial elation here assumed U.S. would now move in on Cuba, but when it developed U.S. committed itself not invade Cuba with its own forces at least, local opinion was disappointed rather than relieved. U.S. may have solved missile menace for U.S. but it has not solved Castro problem for hemisphere. This may be gap in understanding because public interpreted incident as power showdown not only with Soviets but with Castro as well.

Another gap is misunderstanding Kennedy guarantee not to invade which is assumed to mean he has guaranteed Castro regime, since local opinion sees no way to overthrow Castro except by direct U.S. invasion.

Consequently communist propaganda is most effective (1) alleging Khrushchev has saved peace by magnanimously removing missiles and (2) boasting Khrushchev by statesmanlike action has "guaranteed" Castro regime.

Continued existence of Soviet bombers in Cuba does not seem to have much psychological impact as yet. Sino-India clash has had some effect neutralist exponents and has also elicited official GOB support for India.

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-2- 513, November 9, 7 p.m. from La Paz

Undoubtedly this support India is effort justify past
GOB neutralist position on cold war issues and imply
continuity its position. Thus anti-Chinese Communist
implications its support India not explicit.

Response second paragraph reference telegram follows.

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